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  The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) ran into rough weather in Miami 
last November. The patchwork deal to let countries go in different directions on several 
issues, as each FTAA member might fancy its interests to lie in, was little more than a 
face-saving formula. But if one looks closely at the face, it is evident that USTR 
Zoellick’s love affair with the strategy of going bilateral and regional, both as desirable in 
itself (when many see these proliferating deals as a pox on the world trading system) and 
as a strategic means to spur multilateralism (when in fact many regard it as harming it), 
had floundered. 
In consequence, Doha has resurfaced forcefully as an option, despite the 
premature reports of its demise at Cancun which contained within itself the seeds of 
eventual success, such as the agreement on TRIPS after long and grueling fights between 
developing countries and the pharmaceutical firms. But we would argue that Doha must 
be seen, not just as an option, but in fact as the option that alone can be chosen if we are 
to make significant progress on liberalizing the world trading system further. Why? 
Politics and FTAs 
 Part of the reason for the Miami failure was what Mr. Zoellick has regrettably 
been unwilling to admit, even while using bilateralism to favour loyal allies (such as 
Australia) and punish fickle friends (such as New Zealand, which was denied an FTA, 
putting it at extreme disadvantage with its rival Australia in the US market): that 
domestic and foreign politics intrudes far too much into the choice of trade partners and 
the agendas covered by bilaterals and regionals. This sets up new roadblocks to trade 
liberalization.  
Thus, it is now widely agreed that the NAFTA negotiations with Mexico led 
many protectionists to zero in on the warts in Mexico’s face, regardless of whether these 
had anything to do with trade, and to allege that free trade with Mexico would not be 
“fair” trade.  This led to a variety of non-trade issues to be made part of negotiations for 
trade liberalization: the state of Mexico’s environment, its labour standards, its provisions 
on intellectual property protection, and the state of its democracy. In the end, NAFTA 
survived, just barely, but trade negotiations ever since have been captured by lobbies, 
good and bad, that seek to advance their agendas by pretending that they are “trade-
related” agendas. This has slowed down trade liberalization, with many developing 
countries now fearful and acting on the increasing realization that trade treaties and 
institutions are being captured and distorted by the powerful business, labour and 
environmental lobbies of the rich nations for their own purposes and to the detriment of 
the poor nations’ trade. 
The difficulties that afflicted the FTAA in Miami would certainly have included 
similar concerns on the part of Brazil which has continued to insist, for instance, that the 
diffusion of appropriate labour standards worldwide should be pursued outside of the 
FTAA negotiations and in a manner that does not involve trade or other sanctions which 
readily lend themselves to protectionism. But this critical problem, which would have 
ironically pitted a Republican US administration (whose commitment to labour standards 
in trade negotiations is simply strategic and aimed at domestic politics} against a 
progressive Brazilian administration (whose pro-labour credentials are undisputed), was 
obscured and trumped by politics of an altogether different variety.  
Brazil has always regarded the FTAA as an extension of NAFTA, with the United 
States playing the hegemon. It favours instead an outward expansion from the Mercosur 
model, where Brazil would be the hegemon. Besides, every influential Brazilian 
remembers, we are told, Ambassador Zoellick’s undiplomatic remark when candidate 
Lula expressed his opposition to FTAA during the campaign: In that case, let him “head 
south to Antarctica”! It is not surprising that the FTAA posed insuperable difficulties: 
after all, it was Canada and Mexico, the two NAFTA allies of the United States, who 
were playing without success for the American positions. Perhaps President Lula and his 
advisers were telling the USTR to trade with Antarctica?  
Bilaterals and Agricultural Subsidies are Incompatible 
 But the main problem is that bilaterals and regionals simply cannot address the 
principal trade issue today: the removal of production and trade subsidies in agriculture. 
How can production subsidies, which the United States and the EU have many of, be cut 
preferentially? It is impossible. At the same time, cutting export subsidies preferentially 
for one’s FTA partners is possible indeed, but politically impossible. Why?  Because it 
turns upside down the political logic of preferential trade deals. When one reduces tariffs 
for only the FTA members, one reduces the competitiveness of non-members whose 
entry into the FTA markets continues to face the tariffs. As the economists Gene 
Grossman and Elhanan Helpman have formally demonstrated, this provides an important 
political motive to sign FTAs. But when it comes to export subsidies, which the EU in 
particular has many of, if they are cut only for the FTA members, then the non-members, 
who maintain their subsidies, increase their competitiveness in the FTA markets. Politics 
then disfavours FTAs. 
 Besides, lax as the discipline of Article 24 of GATT, which sanctions FTAs under 
specific preconditions, has been, the United States itself has long taken the position, 
including under the Clinton administration when Ambassador Stewart Eizenstat 
belabored the EU on this issue, that selective exemption of large sectors is incompatible 
with Article 24. How can FTAs that exempt agricultural subsidies altogether from the axe 
be considered to be compatible with the spirit, as distinct from the letter, of Article 24? 
 So, in the end, if agricultural subsidies are to be attacked, as most WTO members 
recognize is necessary now, there is no option except to go back to Doha. Going down 
the bilateral path is not merely unwise; it is also impractical for the problems at hand.  It 
is time for Mr. Zoellick and Mr. Pascal Lamy, whose inspired leadership on getting the 
Doha Round off the launching pad deserves all our gratitude, to get back instead to the 
business in Geneva. 
 
        
      
 
